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EVIDENCE
I. RES GESTAE EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE RECOGNIZED FOR
POLICEREPORT OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
In State v. Harrison1 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
statements made by a victim to the police shortly after the victim al-
legedly was assaulted sexually qualified as a res gestae exception to the
hearsay rule and the statements could be treated as admissible evi-
dence. The supreme court did not consider the effect of the possible
self-serving character of the victim's statements on the admissibility of
the declarations.
2
In Harrison the alleged victim claimed that Harrison attempted to
rape her when she was walking home alone one night. The victim re-
ported the attack to a police dispatcher who testified later at trial
about their conversation. Several police officers also testified about
their discussions with the victim. One investigator arrived at the crime
scene within minutes after the victim reported the attack. At the scene,
the victim made statements concerning the assault. The authorities as-
signed another investigator to the case, and he spoke with the victim
fifteen hours after the incident.
At trial, the judge admitted the police testimony and both the re-
port made at the crime scene and the statement made fifteen hours
later, under the res gestae or excited utterance exception to the hear-
say rule. Harrison's trial resulted in his conviction for kidnapping and
criminal sexual conduct in the first degree. He appealed the conviction
on several grounds, including the admission of the police testimony
over his hearsay objection.3
Hearsay testimony generally is not admissible evidence.4 Hearsay
is not allowed into evidence because the testimony cannot be tested by
cross-examination and, therefore, may be untrustworthy6 The Federal
Rules of Evidence (FRE), however, contain several exceptions to this
rule.' The first exception admits statements of present sense impres-
sion. Rule 803(1) defines present sense impression as "[a] statement
describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declar-
1. 298 S.C. 333, 380 S.E.2d 818 (1989).
2. See id. at 336-37, 380 S.E.2d at 819-20.
3. Id.
4. FED. R. EVID. 802.
5. See 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1362, at 3 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
6. FED. R. EVID. 803(1)-(24) (hearsay exceptions).
1
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ant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter."7
Under the conditions described by rule 803(1), the substantial contem-
poraneity between event and statement negates the likelihood of delib-
erate and conscious misrepresentation by the declarant s
The second hearsay exception in the FRE covers "excited utter-
ances." Rule 803(2) defines an excited utterance as "[a] statement re-
lating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was
under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition."9 The
theory behind this exception is that circumstances may produce a con-
dition of excitement that temporarily relieves the declarant of the ca-"
pacity for reflection and produces utterances free of conscious
fabrication. 10 Spontaneity is the key factor in both of these
exceptions.11
South Carolina courts have incorporated federal rules 803(1) and
803(2) into the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule.12 For testi-
mony to be admissible under the South Carolina res gestae exception,
the statement "must be substantially contemporaneous with the liti-
gated transaction, and be the instinctive, spontaneous utterances of the
mind while under the active, immediate influences of the transaction;
the circumstances precluding the idea that the utterances are the re-
sult of reflection or designed to make false or self-serving declara-
tions. '13 The South Carolina rule embraces the first two exceptions in
the Federal Rules. 4 Furthermore, the rule leaves a great deal of discre-
tion to the trial judge to determine whether the statements fit under
7. Id. 803(1).
8. S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 828 (4th ed.
1986).
9. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
10. See 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1747 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
11. FED. R. EVID, 803 Advisory Committee's Note. The subject matter of present
sense impressions is narrower than the excited utterance exception. Present sense im-
pressions are limited to statements describing or explaining the event, whereas excited
utterances must only relate to the startling event. Excited utterances can also cover a
longer period of time than allowed with present sense impressions. Present sense impres-
sions, however, are broader in that they can cover events that are not startling, unlike
excited utterances, which are limited to startling events. See id.
12. See W. REISER, A COMPARISON OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE WITH SOUTH
CAROLINA EVIDENCE LAW 50-51 (3d ed. 1987).
13. State v. Quillien, 263 S.C. 87, 97, 207 S.E.2d 814, 819 (1974) (quoting State v.
Long, 186 S.C. 439, 195 S.E. 624 (1938)).
14. "The South Carolina rule that the statement be 'substantially contemporane-
ous with the litigated transaction' seems, when considered with the requirement that the
mind of the declarant be 'under the active, immediate influences of the transaction,' to
embrace both parts of the Federal Rule." W. REISER, supra note 12, at 50 (citing State v.
Blackburn, 271 S.C. 324, 247 S.E.2d 334 (1978)).
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Harrison claimed throughout the trial that the victim had proposi-
tioned him. He further maintained that her statements to the police
were self-serving and that she brought the rape charge to make her
boyfriend jealous."" The court chose to focus on the contemporaneity
of the event with the victim's statements rather than on the possibility
of her self-serving intentions.
In Harrison the South Carolina Supreme Court followed a liberal
approach similar to that of the South Carolina Court of Appeals in Doe
v. Asbury.17 Under the res gestae exception statements are not inad-
missible merely because of their self-serving nature. The court may
consider the self-serving character of a statement, however, as a factor
in determining the spontaneity of the statement."8 Other jurisdictions
have also held that the self-serving nature of a statement is merely a
factor and is not determinative on the issue of the admissibility of the
res gestae.19
South Carolina courts consistently have admitted statements
made by assault victims when the statements are made during the vic-
tim's first opportunity to speak to the police.20 In Harrison the su-
preme court focused on the testimony by the police officers and dis-
patcher that the victim was in a very emotional state when she made
her statements. 2' The court's emphasis implies that they believed the
victim was still under the active, immediate influence of the alleged
event. The court was not influenced by the fact that a significant
amount of time had passed between the attack and the victim's first
report, or that she had spoken to others before speaking to the police.
The supreme court did not rule that the trial judge abused his
discretion when he admitted statements made by the dispatcher and
officers who arrived shortly after the crime had been reported. The
court did find, however, error in the judge's admission of testimony by
15. See State v. Sosebee, 284 S.C. 411, 413, 326 S.E.2d 654, 656 (1985) (trial judge
has considerable latitude in ruling on the admissibility of evidence).
16. Brief of Appellant at 12-13.
17. 281 S.C. 191, 314 S.E.2d 849 (Ct. App. 1984).
18. Id. at 197, 314 S.E.2d at 853.
19. See, e.g., Bass v. Muenchow, 259 Iowa 1010, 1013, 146 N.W.2d 923, 925 (1966);
Cluster v. Cole, 21 Md. App. 242, 247, 319 A.2d 320, 324 (1974); Walsh v. Table Rock
Asphalt Constr. Co., 522 S.W.2d 116, 121 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Bennett v. Bennett, 92
N.H. 379, 386, 31 A.2d 374, 380 (1943); Cestero v. Ferrara, 57 N.J. 497, 502, 273 A.2d 761,
763 (1971); Clinard v. Southern Pac. Co., 82 N.M. 55, 58, 475 P.2d 321, 324 (1970); Zeller
v. Dahl, 262 Or. 515, 519, 499 P.2d 1316, 1318 (1972).
20. See State v. Cox, 274 S.C. 624, 627, 266 S.E.2d 784, 786 (1980); State v. Quil-
lien, 263 S.C. 87, 96-97, 207 S.E.2d 814, 818-19 (1974); State v. Sharpe, 239 S.C. 258, 271,
122 S.E.2d 622, 629 (1961).
21. See Harrison, 298 S.C. at 337, 380 S.E.2d at 820.
1990]
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an officer who arrived fifteen hours after the attack.22 Although the
officer's testimony described the victim's upset, emotional condition,
23
the substantial period of lapsed time removed the victim from the im-
mediate influence of the event and removed the officer's testimony
from admissibility under res gestae.
24
In Harrison the supreme court re-emphasized the importance of
the contemporaneity of the event and the declarations by holding that
statements made to the police shortly after the assault were admissible
under res gestae, but statements made hours after the incident were
not admissible. The court, however, declined to outline the factors for
courts to consider when presented with possible self-serving declara-
tions under the South Carolina res gestae equation.
Johnathan T. Krawcheck
11. PARTIES CANNOT IMPEACH THEIR OWN WrrNESS'S TESTIMONY
WITH A PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENT UNLESS THE TESTIMONY
SURPRISES AND HARMS THE CALLING PARTY
In State v. Bailey23 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
unless a witness's testimony surprises and harms the calling party, the
court cannot declare the witness hostile, and, therefore, the calling
party cannot impeach the witness's testimony with a prior inconsistent
statement.
The defendant, Wayne Bailey, after arguing with his brother, Rex
Bailey, shot a gun through his brother's house and pickup truck and
stole his brother's shotgun.2 Later that day, Rex Bailey gave a state-
ment to the police and alleged that Wayne had shot the gun and gave
the police other facts about the incident.27 A neighbor's tip enabled
police to seize the gun in Wayne's truck. The police charged Wayne
with burglary in the first degree, discharging a firearm into a dwelling,
grand larceny, and malicious injury to real and personal property.28
Prior to trial, Wayne's counsel notified the solicitor by letter that
Rex's testimony at trial would be inconsistent with his prior state-
ment.2' The trial judge knew that the state intended to impeach Rex,
22. Id.
23. Record at 103.
24. 298 S.C. at 337, 380 S.E.2d at 820.
25. 298 S.C. 1, 377 S.E.2d 581 (1989).
26. Id. at 3, 377 S.E.2d at 582.
27. Id., 377 S.E.2d at 582-83.
28. See Record at 1.
29. Bailey, 298 S.C. at 3, 377 S.E.2d at 583.
[Vol. 42
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EVIDENCE
its own witness, with the prior statement,"0 but decided to allow its use
to refresh Rex's memory.3 1 Wayne's counsel objected to this use of the
statement.2
At trial the state called Rex and he testified that "I remember
writing a statement down, but I don't know everything I put in it.
33
The solicitor then produced a statement which Rex verified was the
one he had given to the police.3 4 When the solicitor questioned Rex
about Wayne's confession, however, he claimed that he could not re-
member the conversation with Wayne or telling the police about it.
Rex responded to the solicitor's request that he refresh his memory
with the statement by stating that he was testifying "as well as I re-
member."35 The judge then ordered him to read the statement aloud,
and when Rex repeatedly attempted to qualify the statement, the
judge directed the solicitor to publish the statement to the jury.36
It is unclear why the solicitor, rather than attempting to bully his
own witness into reading the statement and, thus, impeaching him, did
not simply offer it as substantive evidence under State v. Copeland.
37
In Copeland the supreme court allowed a police officer to testify about
a statement made to him by a witness after the witness denied making
the statement. The court reasoned as follows:
[T]he requirements that the jury observe the declarant and that the
defendant have an opportunity to cross-examine are met where the
declarant takes the stand and is subject to cross-examination. The as-
sertion by a person that the declarant made a prior statement is not
itself hearsay, and the jury can determine the credibility of the wit-
ness on that point.3 8
In Bailey the trial judge apparently admitted the prior statement
as substantive evidence because Rex verified it to be the one he had
given and because he was available for cross-examination. A simple of-
fer by the solicitor would have avoided the impeachment problem be-
cause Rex had not given any testimony that contradicted the state-
ment, and no reason, therefore, existed to impeach him. Instead, the
solicitor published the statement, and Wayne appealed his conviction
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See Record at 8.
33. Id. at 49.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 51.
36. Bailey, 298 S.C. at 3, 377 S.E.2d at 583.
37. 278 S.C. 572, 300 S.E.2d 63 (1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1214, reh'g denied,
463 U.S. 1249 (1983).
38. Id. at 581-82, 00 S.E.2d at 69 (quoting Gibbons v. State, 248 Ga. 858, 863, 286
S.E.2d 717, 721 (1982)).
1990]
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based, in part, on the trial court's error in allowing the state to im-
peach its own witness. The state asserted that no impeachment oc-
curred. It argued that the prosecutor merely had used the statement to
refresh Rex's memory.39 The supreme court did not discuss the distinc-
tion between refreshment and impeachment when a witness asserts
that he cannot remember. The key seems to be that when, as in Bailey,.
the witness does not deny making the statement, questioning him to
induce an explanation is permissible, but publication by the solicitor
amounts to impeaching his testimony4 0
The Bailey court relied on State v. Hamlet 1 and held that the
state impermissibly impeached its own witness because it had not been
surprised by the testimony and the trial judge had not declared the
witness hostile.4 2 The Bailey decision follows South Cdrolina prece-
dent 3 and reaffirms the orthodox view that a party can impeach his
own witness only when the witness is hostile or recalcitrant.4 This
rule, however, has come into increasing disfavor because its rationale
does not logically relate to the purposes of evidentiary restrictions in
our modern adversarial system.45
39. Record at 11.
40. See Bailey, 298 S.C. at 3-4, 377 S.E.2d at 583. The court's decision seems to be
based on the fact that "[w]hen Rex persistently interspersed additional testimony into
the statement, the Court directed the solicitor to publish the statement." Id. at 3, 377
S.E.2d at 583; see also State v. Richburg, 250 S.C. 451, 158 S.E.2d 769 (1968) aft'd, 253
S.C. 458, 171 S.E.2d 592 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 930 (1970) (prejudicial error to
allow solicitor to read witness's statement to jury); State v. Nelson, 192 S.C. 422, 7
S.E.2d 72 (1940) (prejudicial error to allow solicitor to publish answers given by witness
at coroner's inquest).
41. 294 S.C. 77, 362 S.E.2d 644 (1987).
42. The court, however, upheld the conviction because the error was harmless in
light of the other evidence presented. See Bailey, 298 S.C. at 5, 377 S.E.2d at 584 (record
contains sufficient competent evidence to support conviction).
43. See, e.g., State v. Hamlet, 294 S.C. 77, 79, 362 S.E.2d 644, 645 (1987) (when
witness testified inconsistently with prior statement given to police, court held that
state's impeachment of its own witness constituted error because witness was not de-
clared hostile).
44. See, e.g., Note, The New Federal Rules of Evidence and South Carolina Evi-
dentiary Law: A Comparison and Critical Analysis, 28 S.C.L. REv. 481, 503 (1977) [here-
inafter Note, Comparison and Critical Analysis] (South Carolina adheres to the ortho-
dox rule rather than a rule similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 607, which allows any
party to attack the credibility of any witness); Note, Impeaching One's Own Witness, 49
VA. L. REV. 996, 1001 (1963) (to allow admission of a prior inconsistent statement courts
generally require that the witness' testimony be material, that it surprise counsel, and
that it damage the party's case).
45. See, e.g., C. McCoRMICF McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 38, at 84-85 (E. Cleary 3d
ed. 1984) More and more jurisdictions are abandoning the rule prohibiting or limiting
impeachment of one's own witness because the rule "is a serious obstruction to the ascer-
tainment of the truth ...... Id.; see also 3A J. WIGMORE, EVMENCE §§ 896-903, at 658-
(Vol. 42
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The Bailey court gave two reasons for following the traditional
rule:
The reasons underlying the rule are, first, that the party by calling the
witness to testify vouches for the trustworthiness of the witness, and
second, that the power to impeach is the power to coerce the witness
to testify as desired, under the implied threat of blasting the character
of the witness if the witness does not.
40
The first reason, known as the voucher theory, is based on the idea
that the party calling the witness vouches for the trustworthiness of
the witness. Accordingly, the trial court should not allow the party to
contradict the testimony.47 This reason applied when courts first for-
mulated the rule,48 and parties chose "oath helpers, '49 usually family
members and friends, to testify about the trustworthiness of the wit-
ness instead of about the occurrence of facts.50 Most modern commen-
tators, however, have rejected the voucher theory because today parties
generally do not freely choose their witnesses. Instead, parties choose
witnesses because they can testify about the occurrence of certain
events.51 Furthermore, courts should reject the voucher theory because,
672 (J. Chadbourn ed. 1970) (The basis for the rule is no longer applicable. The only real
danger is that the prior statement will be used as substantive evidence by the jury and
courts can guard against this danger with proper instructions to the jury.).
46. State v. Bailey, 298 S.C. 1, 3, 377 S.E.2d 581, 583 (1989) (quoting C. McCoR-
MICK, supra note 45, § 38). It is ironic that the Bailey court cites McCormick to justify
its ruling because McCormick concludes that "a rule against the showing of prior incon-
sistent statements of one's own witness, to aid in evaluating the testimony of the witness,
is a serious obstruction to the ascertainment of truth, even in criminal cases." C. McCoR-
MICK, supra note 45, § 38, at 84-85.
47. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 45, § 38, at 82. "[T]he party by calling the
witness to testify vouches for the trustworthiness of the witness .... ." Id.
48. The exact origin of the rule prohibiting impeachment by the calling party is
unknown, but at least three theories about the origin exist. See, e.g., Note, Impeaching
One's Own Witness, supra note 44, at 996. Authorities differ about whether rule
originated in Roman law, in the medieval practice of trial by compurgation, or in the
transition from an inquisitorial to an adversarial method of trial. Id.
49. J. WIGMORE, supra note 45, § 896, at 659.
50. See id.; Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness-New Developments, 4 U.
CHI L. REv. 69, 69-70 (1939).
51. See FED. R. Evm. 607 Advisory Committee's Note. ("A party does not hold out
his witnesses as worthy of belief, since he rarely has a free choice in selecting them."); C.
McCoRMICK, supra note 45, § 38, at 82 (Except when a party calls an expert or character
witnesses, he has "little or no choice of witnesses [and] calls only those who happen to
have observed the particular facts in controversy."); 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEIN-
STEIN'S EVIDENCE 607-2 (quoting The Proposed Rules of Evidence: Hearing Before the
Special Subcommittee on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 284 (1973) (statement of Mr. Kleiboemer Staff of the
Deputy Att'y Gen. for the Admin. of Criminal Justice)) (a witness who gave testimony
that conflicted with a prior statement "is an essential witness in the sense that the jury
1990]
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as Dean Ladd once stated, it "fails to take into account the inability of
a party to select witnesses whose testimony he may predict with cer-
tainty."52 State v. Copeland53 contains additional support for this view.
In Copeland the South Carolina Supreme Court noted that "the oath
is not as strong a guaranty of truth as once it may have been ...."5
The South Carolina Supreme Court has created an exception that
allows impeachment when the party is obliged to call a witness, such as
a witness who has subscribed to an instrument.55 In some criminal
cases a witness might be so essential to the state's case that it is, for all
practical purposes, compelled to call the witness. 5 In these cases the
state cannot vouch for the witness' trustworthiness. Little distinction
exists between having to take a witness the way one finds him and
being obliged to call him. The courts should treat the calling party the
same in both situations.5 7
The second reason given by the Bailey court to justify the prohibi-
tion on impeachment of one's own witness is the coercion theory.5 ' In
1980 the supreme court stated that "[t]he rule against impeaching
one's own witness is intended for the protection of the witness. '59 The
coercion theory addresses this concern. The basis of the theory is that
will be suspicious if you do not produce him."); 3A J. WIGMOR, supra note 45, § 898, at
662 (quoting May, Some Rules of Evidence in 11 Ari. L. REv. 261, 264 (1876)) (Witnesses
are determined by "history and course of the events which are to come under examina-
tion .... [They] are not such as the parties have selected at their pleasure."); Graham,
Examination of a Party's Own Witness Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A prom-
ise Unfulfilled, 54 TEx. L. REV. 917, 920 (1976) ("[A] party does not select his witnesses,
but simply takes the witnesses as he finds them."); Ladd, supra note 50, at 77 ("Except
in the case of character witnesses and expert testimony, parties under the adversary sys-
tem do not choose any persons they might like to place upon the witness stand, but are
forced to take those, good or bad, who by fate or chance happen to have been exposed to
the opportunity of observing or hearing facts which pertain to the case on trial.").
52. Ladd, supra note 50, at 78.
53. 278 S.C. 572, 300 S.E.2d 63 (1982) (court allowed use of prior statements as
substantive evidence when the jury can observe the declarant, and the declarant is sub-
ject to cross-examination), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1214, reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1249
(1983).
54. Id. at 581, 300 S.E.2d at 69 (quoting Gibbons v. State, 248 Ga. 858, 863, 206
S.E.2d 717, 721 (1982)).
55. See, e.g., White v. Southern Oil Stores, 198 S.C. 173, 177, 17 S.E.2d 150, 151
(1941) (subscribing witness to deed or will).
56. See J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 51.
57. See Ladd, supra note 50, at 78 (though the party has no legal to duty to call
"the particular witness . . . if he expects to present his case at all in court, he must
select those available or have none" and, therefore, courts should treat the party as if it
had such a duty).
58. Bailey, 298 S.C. at 3, 377 S.E.2d at 583.
59. Reid v. Kelly, 274 S.C. 171, 174, 262 S.E.2d 24, 26 (1980); Fare v. Thompson, 25
S.C.L. (Chev.) 37, 45 (1839) (allowed impeachment by prior inconsistent deposition).
[Vol. 42
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a party who can impeach can coerce the witness to testify as desired by
the implied threat to blast the character of the witness if the witness
does not testify as desired. 0
While this theory is logical if the party impeaches the witness by at-
tacking his character or by showing corruption, it does not apply to the
use of a prior inconsistent statement which "merely casts doubt on a
witness' [sic] trustworthiness in reporting one incident without attack-
ing his character in general." 1 Dean Wigmore recognizes the concern
that the fear of being abused by the calling party will "prevent a re-
pentant witness from recanting a previously falsified story, and would
more or less affect every witness who knew that the party calling him
expected him to tell a particular story. '62 Wigmore, however, rebuts
this concern:
The policy of protecting the witness, subjectively, against the fear of
being abused and held up to disgrace, in case he should disappoint the
expectations of the party calling him, obviously cannot regard the ex-
posure of a self-contradiction as a legitimate reason for such appre-
hension on the part of the witness. There is no necessary implication
of bad character, no smirching of reputation, no exposure of misdeeds
on cross-examination, nothing that could fairly operate to coerce ei-
ther an honest or a dishonest witness to persist in an incorrect story
through fear of the party calling him. An honest witness could readily
explain how he came to make the former statement; a dishonest one
would not be deterred from returning to truth by such a trifling
obstacle.6"
Other commentators have also questioned whether.the threat of
coercion justifies putting the calling party at the mercy of his witness
and his opponent.6 4 This possibility is particularly troublesome when,
as in Bailey, one family member is asked to testify against another. In
these cases a strong possibility exists that a family member's desire to
protect the other will affect his testimony. 5 When the calling party
60. See Bailey, 298 S.C. at 3, 377 S.E.2d at 583.
61. Graham, supra note 51, at 920.
62. 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 45, § 899, at 664.
63. Id. § 903, at 669.
64. See, e.g., FED. R Evm. 607 Advisory Committee's Note (stating that the tradi-
tional rule is based upon "false premises"); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 21, § 45, at 82-83.
65. See Ladd, supra note 50, at 85 ("Sympathy for the accused in criminal cases
plays a large part in causing witnesses to change their testimony, as many people dislike
to take an active part in causing imprisonment, particularly when friends or relatives are
involved."). See also Note, Impeaching One's Own Witness, supra note 44, at 1009 (indi-
cating that bias should be equivalent to hostility). Cf. United States v. Insana, 423 F.2d
1165, 1170 (2d Cir. 1970) (court allowed substantive use of prior inconsistent statement
when "recalcitrant witness who has testified to one or more relevant facts indicates by
his conduct that the reason for his failure to continue to so testify is not a lack of mem-
1990]
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cannot question the truth of the witness's statement, "the door [is
open] to possible one-sided presentation. Such a situation is the an-
tithesis of a search for truth, for both parties should be on the same
footing." 6
Although commentators generally have rejected both the voucher
theory and the coercion theory,6 7 a third reason for the rule against
impeachment receives more favorable treatment. Professor McCormick
explains that "[tihe theory of attack by prior inconsistent statements
is not based on the assumption that the present testimony is false and
the former statement true but rather upon the notion that [the incon-
sistency] . . . raises a doubt as to the truthfulness of both state-
ments. '06 He asserts that "[i]t is difficult to see any justification for
prohibiting [impeachment by prior inconsistent statement].. . . Per-
haps there is a fear that the previous statement will be considered by
the jury as substantive evidence of the facts asserted if, as in various
jurisdictions, the statement for that purpose will be hearsay."69 This
notion is true if parties commonly use prior inconsistent statements to
impeach. In South Carolina courts, however, the jury can consider
prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence.7" In Copeland
the supreme court stated its approval of the view that, at least in some
situations, the prior statement is more reliable and should be admitted,
and the trial court should leave the decision about its reliability to the
jury.71 The Bailey court perhaps.recognized that using the third ration-
ory but a desire 'not to hurt anyone'. ... "), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970); C. Mc-
CoRucK, supra note 21, § 33, at 72-73 (bias on account of emotional influences like
kinship is one of the main ways to attack a witness' credibility).
66. Note, Impeaching One's Own Witness, supra note 44, at 1019.
67. See supra notes 47-66 and accompanying text.
68. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 45, § 34, at 74.
69. Id. § 38, at 83. See also 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 45, § 903, at 672 (only real
danger is that jury will use prior statement as substantive evidence, but this is not seri-
ous enough to outweigh the advantages of using it and can be guarded against by in-
structing the jury).
70. See State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 581, 300 S.E.2d 63, 69 (1982) (police officer
testified concerning witness's prior statement; court held "testimony of prior inconsistent
statements... [can be] used as substantive evidence when the declarant testifies at trial
and is subject to cross-examination"), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1214, reh'g denied, 463 U.S.
1249 (1983).
71. See id. at 582, 300 S.E.2d at 69. "[P]rior statements ... are made closer in
time to the event in question, when memories are fresher, and ... the traditional rule
requires the courts to give unrealistic and confusing instructions to the jury." Id. (quot-
ing Gibbons v. State, 248 Ga. 858, 863, 286 S.E.2d 717, 721 (1982)). Commentators gener-
ally support substantive use of prior statements. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 45,
§ 34, at 75 (Statements "made when memory was more recent and when less time for the
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ale given by Professor McCormick would be inconsistent with the
Copeland decision and, thus, refused to use it to support its decision.
If the state had shown surprise and harm in the Bailey case, the
trial judge could have declared Rex Bailey a hostile witness and al-
lowed impeachment. This exception is based on the basic unfairness of
holding a party to testimony that damages his case when a witness en-
trapped the party and the party had no opportunity to prevent the
damage.72 The court, by requiring surprise, ensures that the calling
party does not profit by using the statement when it could have pre-
vented the damage by refusing to call the witness.7 3 Moreover, by re-
quiring harm, the court ensures that evidence is not used substan-
tively, but only to offset the harm already done.7
In Bailey the court addressed the surprise requirement and found
that "[s]ince the State knew that Rex Bailey planned to change his
statement through his testimony, the State could not demonstrate sur-
prise when Mr. Bailey actually testified inconsistently with his state-
ment.' '75 This rule presents no problem when the prosecutor reads the
entire statement to the jury like in Bailey.
The question remains, however, whether the court would allow a
finding of surprise when the calling party believed that the testimony
would be consistent with certain allegations in the prior statement, but
it in fact contradicted them. This situation might occur when a solici-
tor, after receiving notice, probes to ascertain the extent to which the
testimony will be inconsistent with the prior statement. If the solicitor
does this, the testimony genuinely may surprise the solicitor if the tes-
timony is not consistent with the portions of the prior statement that
the solicitor expected it to support. This is true even though the solici-
tor knew that the witness "planned to change his statement through
his testimony . . . . 7 If this situation arises, the court should allow
impeachment so that the solicitor can verify the fragments of the prior
statement that he thought the witness would confirm.
The surprise and damage requirement is also problematic in at
least three other ways. First, it seriously undermines the viability of
the voucher theory. The surprise exception essentially reduces the
voucher theory to the assertion that a party vouches for his own wit-
72. See State v. Trull, 232 S.C. 250, 255-56, 101 S.E.2d 648, 650 (1958).
73. Cf. infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
74. See State v. Richburg, 250 S.C. 451, 458, 158 S.E.2d 769, 771 (1968), affd, 253
S.C. 458, 171 S.E.2d 592 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 930 (1970). "It is not proper to
permit the impeaching testimony to go beyond the only purpose for which [the prior
statement] is admissible-the removal of the damage the surprise has caused." Id. (quot-
ing 58 Am. JuP. Witnesses § 799, at 445).
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ness if the party knows what the witness's testimony will be. Second,
the damage requirement basically tells the calling party that if it could
have prevented the damage to the party's own case, the court should
not allow the party to mitigate that damage. This exception, however,
fails to recognize that the witness' failure to testify to the content of a
prior statement can be just as disastrous to the state's case as testi-
mony that exculpates the defendant. 7
Finally, the reason for maintaining the surprise and damage re-
quirement is inconsistent with the South Carolina rule that allows the
jury to consider prior statements as substantive evidence. 8 Professor
McCormick states, and other commentators agree, that these "limita-
tions are explainable only as attempts to safeguard the hearsay policy
by preventing the party from proving the witness' prior statements in
situations where it appears that its only value to the proponent will be
as substantive evidence. '79 In Nelson the South Carolina Supreme
Court expressed the same concern:
Evidence of contradictory statements is theoretically evidence affect-
ing credibility only, and is not substantive evidence of the facts em-
braced in the contradictory statements; but, nevertheless, evidence of
inconsistent statements does often influence the jury, and, because of
this, a party should not be allowed to interrogate his own witness in
respect to previous inconsistent statements unless he has actually suf-
fered surprise or entrapment.8 0
The hearsay concerns of Nelson are inconsistent with the supreme
court's Copeland decision.8' In Copeland the witness, a prisoner, in-
habited a jail cell next to an accomplice to a robbery and murder. The
witness gave a statement to a police officer about the location of three
guns that the suspects used in the robbery. At trial, the witness denied
77. See J. WEINSTIN & M. BERGER, supra note 51, at 607-2.
78. See State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 581, 300 S.E.2d 63, 69 (1982) cert. denied,
463 U.S. 1214 (1983).
79. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 45, § 38, at 83-84. See also Graham, supra note 51,
at 977 ("These requirements were developed to prevent a party's calling a witness in
order to place before the jury prior inconsistent statements not admissible as substantive
evidence."); 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 45, § 904, at 673-74 (quoting Sturgis v. State, 2
Okla. Crim. 362, 390-92, 102 P. 57, 67-68 (1909) (explaining the implications of allowing
hearsay to be introduced by criminal defendants, who might invent prior statements,
would be to make conviction impossible)).
80. State v. Nelson, 192 S.C. 422, 427, 7 S.E.2d 72, 75 (1940).
81. A justification for the surprise and damage requirement, which is more logically
consistent with Copeland than the Trull rationale, is that, because the reason for al-
lowing impeachment here is to protect a party who was denied the opportunity to pro-
tect himself by not calling the witness at all, the limitations ensure that the only purpose
for using the prior statement is to return him to the same position he would have been in
if he had not called the witness.
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giving the statement, but the trial court allowed the officer to testify
about the statement. The court held that a party can use prior incon-
sistent statements as substantive evidence. The court explained:
With respect to the truth of the prior statement, the jury has the op-
portunity to observe the declarant as he may repudiate or vary his
former statement, and as he is cross-examined. Thus, the jury can de-
termine whether to believe the present testimony, the prior testi-
mony-or neither .... [P]rior statements .. .are made closer in
time to the event in question, when memories are fresher, and ... the
traditional rule requires the courts to give unrealistic and confusing
instructions to the jury ...
We believe the adoption of this rule will more effectively aid in
the discovery of truth, and more adequately insure the freedom of the
innocent and the conviction of the guilty.
82
The same considerations apply anytime a party calls a witness who has
made a prior inconsistent statement. The rule against impeaching one's
own witness with a prior statement'could be disastrous to the jury's
search for truth if the prior statement were more reliable than the wit-
ness' testimony.
In summary, the reasons courts have advanced in support of the
rule against impeachment of one's own witness by prior inconsistent
statements do not apply in our modern adversarial system. Further-
more, the exceptions to the rule that the South Carolina Supreme
Court has established undermine the rule's continued vitality. In 1975,
Congress abrogated the common law rule against impeaching one's own
witness, to the extent that it had applied in federal courts, by adopting
Federal Rule of Evidence 607. In its present form, Rule 607 states:
"The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including
the party calling the witness." ' In 1985, the South Carolina General
Assembly adopted the Rules of Civil Procedure and further liberalized
the South Carolina anti-impeachment rule. Professor Reiser explains
that, "under S.C.R. Civ. P. 32(a)(2) 'the deposition of a party... may
be used by an adverse party for any purpose.' And, under S.C.R. Civ.
P. 43(b)(2), a party may impeach 'any hostile or unwilling wit-
ness'. . . ."I If the supreme court does not act to change the existing
rule as it applies in criminal cases, then the General Assembly should
consider a complete statutory abrogation of this harmful rule. Allowing
impeachment of one's own witness in a case like Bailey "will more ef-
82. Copeland, 278 S.C. at 582, 300 S.E.2d at 69 (quoting Gibbons v. State, 248 Ga.
858, 863, 286 S.E.2d 717, 721 (1982)).
83. FED. R. Evw. 607.
84. W. REISER, A COMPAISON OF THE FEDERAL RuLEs OF EVIDENCE WITH SOUTH
CAROLINA EVIDENCE LAW 28 (3d ed. 1987).
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fectively aid in the discovery of truth, and more adequately insure the
freedom of the innocent and the conviction of the guilty.""5
W. David Kelly, III
III. JUDGE'S INSTRUCTION TO JURY THAT MALICE MAY BE PRESUMED
Is HARMLESS ERROR
In Yates v. Aiken 8 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a
judge's instruction to the jury that they may presume malice from the
defendant's use of a deadly weapon was harmless error. 7 The court,
however, acknowledged that the instruction was unconstitutional.8
Yates is the first South Carolina case to follow the United States Su-
preme Court case Rose v. Clark,"" in which the Court held a harmless
error analysis applies to unconstitutional jury instructions that concern
an element of the criminal offense.
In 1981 a jury convicted Yates of murder, armed robbery, assault
and battery with intent to kill, and conspiracy. The court sentenced
Yates to death.90 Yates and another man, Davis, attempted to rob a
rural store near Greenville. Yates entered the store with a gun while
Davis brandished a knife. Yates demanded money from the store
owner, and, when the owner hesitated, Yates shot him through the
hand and wounded him in the chest. Yates took the money and fled to
the car. The owner's mother entered the store when she heard the
shots. Davis stabbed and killed her. The owner then shot and killed
Davis. The State of South Carolina tried and convicted Yates for the
murder of the owner's mother on the theory of accomplice liability.9'
The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed Yates' murder conviction
on direct appeal.2 .Yates petitioned the court for a writ of habeas
corpus, and the South Carolina court denied the writ by summary
order.
The United States Supreme Court vacated South Carolina's sum-
mary denial of Yates' petition for writ of habeas corpus.93 The Court
remanded Yates' petition for reconsideration in light of its decision in
85. Copeland, 278 S.C. at 582, 300 S.E.2d at 69.
86. - S.C. -, 391 S.E.2d 530, cert. granted sub noma., Yates v. Evatt, 111 S. Ct. 41
(1990).
87. Id. at -, 391 S.E.2d at 531.
88. Id.
89. 478 U.S. 570 (1986).
90. Yates, - S.C. at .. , 391 S.E.2d at 530.
91. Id. at -, 391 S.E.2d at 531-32.
92. State v. Yates, 280 S.C. 29, 310 S.E.2d 805 (1982) (subsequent history omitted).
93. Yates v. Aiken, 474 U.S. 896 (1985) (subsequent history omitted).
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Francis v. Franklin.94 In Francis the United States Supreme Court
held that due process prohibits the state from using evidentiary pre-
sumptions in a criminal jury charge because such a use effectively re-
lieves the state of its burden of proof and persuasion on every element
of the crime.95 In Francis the defendant admitted that he had shot the
victim, but he denied that he did so voluntarily or intentionally. He
claimed that his gun went off by accident.96 The erroneous instruction
given by the trial judge in Francis dealt with the dispositive issue of
Franklin's intent. The judge instructed the jury that "[t]he acts of a
person of sound mind and discretion are presumed to be the product of
the person's will, but the presumption may be rebutted. ' 97 The Court
held that this instruction shifted the burden of persuasion on the in-
tent element to Franklin."
The South Carolina Supreme Court determined that the jury
charge in Yates suffered from the same constitutional infirmity as the
erroneous jury charge in Francis.99 Thus, Francis appeared directly on
point in Yates. The supreme court, however, did not apply Francis.
First, the court noted that in State v. Elmore'00 the South Carolina
Supreme Court previously disallowed jury instructions like those found
in Francis.101 The court decided Elmore two years after Yates' trial in
1983. Second, the court, as a matter of state law, decided not to apply
Elmore retroactively to cases on collateral review. 10 2 The court did not
address further the potential impact of the Supreme Court's holding in
Francis on its decision in Yates. For the second time, the court refused
to grant Yates' petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 03
The United States Supreme Court in Yates v. Aiken'" reversed
South Carolina's decision and admonished the state court for not re-
sponding to the Court's mandate to reconsider Yates' petition in light
of Francis. The Court held that South Carolina could not avoid Fran-
cis by declining to apply the opinion's constitutional rule retroactively
in light of Elmore.10 5 The Yates Court cited its decision in Sandstrom
94. 471 U.S. 307, 313-25 (1985).
95. Id. at 310-11.
96. Id. at 311.
97. Id. at 325.
98. Yates v. Aiken, 290 S.C. 231, 233, 349 S.E.2d 84, 85 (1986).
99. Id.
100. 279 S.C. 417, 308 S.E.2d 781 (1983), appeal after remand, 286 S.C. 70, 332
S.E.2d 762 (1985), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 476 U.S. 1101 (1986), appeal
after remand, 300 S.C. 130, 386 S.E.2d 769 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2633 (1990).
101. Yates, 290 S.C. at 233, 349 S.E.2d at 85.
102. Id. at 237, 349 S.E.2d at 87.
103. Id.
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v. Montana0" and held that Francis was merely an extension of the
law that had existed prior to Yates' trial.10 7 In Sandstrom the defend-
ant denied that he purposefully or knowingly killed his victim. The
trial judge, however, instructed the jury that "[tihe law presumes that
a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts
.... ,011 The Supreme Court ruled that the instruction was unconsti-
tutional because the jury may have interpreted the presumption as
conclusive or as if it shifted the burden of persuasion from the state to
the defendant.109
Once again the Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsidera-
tion with the following warning: "Since [the South Carolina Supreme
Court] has considered the merits of the federal claim, it has a duty to
grant the relief that federal law requires." 1 0 On reconsideration the
South Carolina Supreme Court admitted the Supreme Court's opinion
and constrained it to apply Francis.""' The South Carolina court,
therefore, conceded to the Supreme Court and recognized the constitu-
tional error in Yates' trial.11 2 The persistent state court, however, ruled
that the constitutional error was harmless.'13
The South Carolina Court relied on Rose v. Clark,"4 a decision in
which the United States Supreme Court held that jury instructions
that violate Francis are subject to a harmless error analysis." 5 An erro-
neous mandatory presumption is harmless when "the evidence is so
dispositive of the element subject to the presumption that the review-
ing court can say beyond a reasonable doubt the jury would have found
it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption."'"16
The Yates holding confirms the South Carolina Supreme Court's
opinion in State v. Gaskins."' In Gaskins the court held that an erro-
neous instruction on the presumption of malice was harmless."8 Gas-
kins, however, concerned a particularly heinous, well known, and previ-
ously convicted murderer. The presence of these acts in Gaskins
106. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
107. 484 U.S. 211, 216-17. Justice Finney made this same point in his dissent when
the United States Supreme Court first remanded the case. Yates v. Aiken, 349 S.E.2d 84,
88-89 (1986) (Finney, J., dissenting).
108. 442 U.S. at 514-19.
109. Yates, 484 U.S. at 218.
110. Id.
111. Yates, - S.C. at .-, 391 S.E.2d at 531.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. 478 U.S. 570 (1986).
115. Id. at 580-82.
116. Yates, - S.C. at , 391 S.E.2d at 531 (citing Rose, 478 U.S. at 583).
117. 284 S.C. 105, 326 S.E.2d 132, cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1120 (1985).
118. Id. at 116-17, 326 S.E.2d at 139-40.
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perhaps gave the court more confidence to apply the harmless error
analysis than was possible in Yates.
The court's harmless error analysis in Yates focused on "whether
it [was] beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found it
unnecessary to rely on the erroneous mandatory presumption. . ... 119
The United States Supreme Court made the same inquiry in Sand-
strom. 120 Because no one disputed that Davis brutally and repeatedly
stabbed to death the store owner's mother, the court held that the jury
did not have to rely on the erroneous instruction to conclude that
Yates had acted with malice when he shot Willie Wood.
1 21
The Yates dissenters, however, noted that the jurors may have
been confused by the instruction that they were to presume malice
from the use of a deadly weapon. The confusion may have existed be-
cause both Davis and Yates carried deadly weapons.1 22 Even though
Yates possessed a gun, this would have been insufficient to prove mal-
ice but for the erroneous instruction. 2 3 Moreover, the presumption
may have defeated Yates' primary defense that he had withdrawn from
the enterprise before it turned murderous. 2 ' For these reasons, the
dissenters' opinion raised reasonable doubt as to the harmlessness of
the instruction.
1 25
South Carolina is not the only state to apply a harmless error
analysis to the type of errors found in Francis. In McKenzie v. Os-
borne126 the Montana Supreme Court held that an unconstitutional
Francis-type jury charge was harmless because "overwhelming evi-
dence support[ed] the conviction. 1 27 The Arizona Supreme Court also
has held that erroneous burden-shifting instructions may be harmless.
In State v. Jensen 28 the Arizona court considered an instruction that,
like the one in Yates, implied malice from the use of a deadly weapon.
The court held that under Rose the charge was harmless because the
evidence of guilt was overwhelming and, the judge had repeatedly em-
phasized to the jury that the state bore the burden of proof. 2 "
Some justices, however, believe that errors in Francis-type instruc-
tions are too fundamental to be harmless. For example, Justice Black-
119. Yates, - S.C. at _, 391 S.E.2d at 532.
120. 442 U.S. at 514-17.
121. Yates, - S.C. at _, 391 S.E.2d at 532.
122. Id. at 391 S.E.2d at 534 (Toal, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at --, 391 S.E.2d at 534-35.
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. 195 Mont. 26, 640 P.2d 368 (1981).
127. Id. at 41, 640 P.2d at 377.
128. 153 Ariz. 171, 735 P.2d 781 (1987).
129. Id. at 178, 735 P.2d at 788.
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mun in his Rose dissent argued that "the instruction ... interfered so
fundamentally with the jury's performance of its constitutionally man-
dated role that the error involved is analytically indistinguishable from
those errors the Court finds inappropriate for harmless-error analy-
sis. '130 When the United States Supreme Court first remanded Yates,
Justice Finney argued in dissent that the instructions "extend to every
element of the crime and invade the truth-finding function which, in a
criminal case, the law assigns solely to the jury. '131
Although the Yates dissenters on remand argued that the United
States Supreme Court's latest opinion did not invite a harmless error
analysis, that option clearly remains open under Rose until it is ex-
pressly foreclosed by the Court. Also, it is doubtful whether the subtle
and highly technical differences between "mandatory presumptions"
and "permissive inferences" are appreciated by jurors when presented
in a lengthy oral jury charge. Whatever prejudice arises from the use of
an erroneous presumption in a jury charge that is otherwise replete
with references to the state's burden of proof should not require cate-
gorical reversal. Rather, the appellate courts should be relied upon to
review each case's entire record and decide whether the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Matthew Hubbell
IV. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ORDER NOT ADMISSIBLE As EVIDENCE IN
LATER PROCEEDING IF IT PREJUDICES CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF WHO WAS
NOT A PARTY TO THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
In Rowe v. City of Columbia'32 the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that a defendant cannot use a declaratory judgment order as evi-
dence in a subsequent proceeding if the order is prejudicial to a plain-
tiff who was not a party in the earlier proceeding.133
In March 1985 Lorinda Jean Rowe died when her car collided with
a City of Columbia fire truck.134 In April 1985 the South Carolina Su-
preme Court issued its opinion in McCall v. Batson,13 5 which abolished
sovereign immunity in South Carolina and allowed a plaintiff to re-
cover up to the amount of the government's insurance coverage in
130. 478 U.S. at 593 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
131. Yates v. Aiken, 290 S.C. 231, 239, 349 S.E.2d 84, 89 (1986) (Finnny, J.,
dissenting).
132. 300 S.C. 447, 388 S.E.2d 789 (1989).
133. Id. at 449-50, 388 S.E.2d at 790-91.
134. Id. at 448, 388 S.E.2d at 789.
135. 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741 (1985).
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cases filed on or before July 1, 1986."'6
Joanna Rowe, the administrator of Rowe's estate, brought a
wrongful death action against the truck driver and the City of Colum-
bia (the City). The trial court dismissed the claim without prejudice.
Shortly thereafter, the City brought a declaratory judgment action
against its insurer to determine whether its policy covered injuries
caused by the fire truck. The trial court held that the policy excluded
such coverage and the supreme court affirmed."' 7
In May 1986 Rowe renewed the estate's claim against the City.
The trial judge granted the City's summary judgment motion based on
its finding that no applicable insurance coverage existed, and, there-
fore, under McCall, summary judgment was appropriate. The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. 38 On appeal, the supreme
court held that because the appellant was not a party to the declara-
tory judgment, the trial court's reliance on the declaratory judgment
order for evidence that no applicable coverage existed was extremely
prejudicial to Rowe and, thus, was prohibited by Pharr v. Canal Insur-
ance Co." 9 and South Carolina Code section 15-53-80.140
In Pharr the supreme court held that a declaration that the in-
surer is not obligated to pay the claims of the insured does not bar
claims by an injured person who was not a party to the declaratory
action.14' The City tried to distinguish Pharr, arguing that its holding
136. See id. at 246, 329 S.E.2d at 743.
137. Rowe, 300 S.C. at 448-49, 388 S.E.2d at 790.
138. Id.
139. 233 S.C. 266, 104 S.E.2d 394 (1958).
140. Rowe, 300 S.C. at 449-50, 388 S.E.2d at 790.
141. 233 S.C. at 272-76, 104 S.E.2d at 397-99. But see Ophein v. American Interin-
surance Exch., 430 N.W.2d 118 (Iowa 1988). The supreme court relied on old South Car-
olina Code section 10-2008 (Michie 1952). The Rowe court relied on the current version
of that section which is Code section 15-53-80. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-53-80 (Law. Co-op.
1976).
In Opheim the Iowa Supreme Court held that a declaratory judgment obtained by
an insurer against its insured was binding against an injured party. The court attached
significance to the injured party's adequate representation by the insured's vigorous de-
fense to the insurance company's claim that no policy coverage existed. The court con-
cluded that "[t]he interest of Allie [the insured] and Opheim [the injured] in securing
this coverage is identical. In that regard, we do not believe Opheim could have litigated
this issue in a manner materially different from that employed by Allie." Opheim, 430
N.W.2d at 121.
The facts in the Rowe case provide some evidence of vigorous representation be-
cause the City appealed the declaratory judgment order to the South Carolina Supreme
Court. Rowe, 300 S.C. at 449, 388 S.E.2d at 790. It is unlikely, however, that the City had
the same degree of interest as Rowe to have the policy cover the type of accident suf-
fered by Rowe because under McCall v. Batson the City would not be liable if no cover-
age existed. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
The Opheim court also noted that the Iowa rules lacked the language found in other
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applied only to a res judicata defense. The City claimed that the trial
court's use of the declaratory judgment order for "persuasive authority
on the issue of insurance coverage"'142 did not prejudice Rowe because
the court did not rely solely on the order to reach its decision. 43 The
City contended that no evidence of insurance coverage would have ex-
isted even if the trial court had not considered the declaratory judg-
ment order. " ' The supreme court rejected this argument. The court
attached significance to the trial court's decision to make the summary
judgment order contingent upon the result of the City's appeal in the
declaratory action and held that "[t]he use of the declaratory judgment
in this action was extremely prejudicial to Rowe because she could not
maintain an action against the City unless it had insurance
coverage.'
4 5
The Rowe court's opinion is consistent with the language of South
Carolina Code section 15-53-80. Section 15-53-80 provides that "no
declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the pro-
ceeding.' 4 If the court had interpreted the word "prejudice" narrowly
in section 15-53-80, it may have reached a different result. This narrow
interpretation, however, would have allowed the City to circumvent the
requirement that the legislature set forth in section 15-53-80, which
states that "all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any
interest which would be affected by the declaration .... ,7
Although the Rowe court correctly applied the statute, this deci-
sion raises a troublesome question whether the City could have a judg-
ment entered against it and, at the same time, have no insurance to'
cover its liability. This situation arises if the court (1) allows Rowe to
pursue her claim against the City in the insurer's absence, (2) rules
that coverage exists, (3) enters judgment against the City, and (4) finds
that no coverage exists in a subsequent proceeding by the City against
the insurer. This situation does not arise, however, if the court joins
the insurer as an indispensable party under SCRCP 19(a).14 1 If the
court does not join the insurer, the City could be forced to satisfy the
jurisdictions that" 'no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the
proceeding.'" 430 N.W.2d at 121 (citations omitted). Thus, in Iowa injured persons are
proper rather than necessary parties to a declaratory judgment action. Id.
142. Brief of Respondents at 5.
143. Id. at 6.
144. Id. at 5.
145. Rowe, 300 S.C. at 450, 388 S.E.2d at 791.
146. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-53-80 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
147. Id.
148. S.C.R. Civ. P. 19(a). This section provides, in pertinent part, that a person
"shall be joined as a party in the action if... in his absence complete relief cannot be
accorded among those already parties. .. If he has not been so joined, the court shall
order that he be made a party." Id.
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judgment out of its own treasury, which would be contrary to the lim-
ited sovereign immunity doctrine set forth in McCall v. Batson.
The trial court used the judgment to prejudice Rowe's claim when
it made the summary judgment order contingent on the outcome of the
prior declaratory judgment. The supreme court prevented what was, in
effect, an application of res judicata and upheld "the wholesome prin-
ciple which allows every litigant one opportunity to try his case on the
merits .... 1,149 On remand, the trial court should require joinder of
the insurer as a defendant before it decides whether the City and its
driver are liable to prevent an outcome that is contrary to the limited
sovereign doctrine set forth in McCall.
W. David Kelly, III
149. Mackey v. Frazier, 234 S.C. 81, 88, 106 S.E.2d 895, 899 (1959) (quoting Jenkins
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 89 S.C. 408, 412, 71 S.E. 1010, 1012 (1911)).
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